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INTRODUCTION 
Staggering numbers of contractor personnel have supported, and continue 
to support, American combat and peace-keeping troops and the government’s 
Herculean reconstruction efforts in Iraq.1 In addition to more than 1000 
 
† Steven L. Schooner is an Associate Professor and Co-Director of the Government 
Procurement Law Program, George Washington University Law School. Professor Schooner 
previously served as the Associate Administrator for Procurement Law and Legislation at 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and as a trial attorney in the Department of 
Justice. As an Army Reserve officer, he is an adjunct professor in the Contract and Fiscal 
Law Department of the Judge Advocate General’s School of the Army in Charlottesville, 
Virginia. This Article, which derives from the author’s September 10, 2004 testimony before 
the Senate Democratic Policy Committee, was improved by comments from Michael J. 
Benjamin, Elizabeth D. Berrigan, Daniel Gordon, Dan Guttman, Timothy Pendolino, Heidi 
M. Schooner, Joshua I. Schwartz, Steven Tomanelli, Jerry Walz, Christopher R. Yukins, and 
the members of the Procurement Round Table. The author thanks Erin Siuda for her prompt 
and diligent research assistance and acknowledges the generous support of the Seymour 
Herman Faculty Research Fund in Government Procurement Law. 
1. From an investment perspective, comparisons to the Marshall Plan abound, and 
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reported military fatalities, many contractor employees have died or been 
injured in performing these services.2 Yet recent experiences in Iraq, 
particularly allegations that contractor personnel were involved in inappropriate 
and potentially illegal activities at the Abu Ghraib prison, expose numerous 
areas of concern with regard to the current state of federal public procurement. 
Sadly, because these incidents coincide with a series of procurement scandals, 
the likes of which the government has not experienced since the late 1980s,3 
 
estimates, in the tens of billions of dollars, widely vary. For example, a White House press 
release stated: “Initial estimates are that Iraq will need between $50-75 billion to achieve 
these conditions for success.” Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White 
House, Fact Sheet: Request for Additional FY 2004 Funding for the War on Terror (Sept. 8, 
2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/iraq/20030908-1.html (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2005). For more on the scope of the effort, see Robert S. Nichols, Iraq 
Reconstruction: Needs, Opportunities, and the Contracting Environment, 80 Fed. Cont. Rep. 
(BNA) No. 15, at 410 (Oct. 28, 2003). The Center for Public Integrity has published two 
particularly helpful resources that offer access to many of the relevant contractual documents 
and organize much of the work by individual contractors: OUTSOURCING THE PENTAGON—
WHO’S WINNING THE BIG CONTRACTS, available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/pns/ (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2005) and WINDFALLS OF WAR: U.S. CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ AND 
AFGHANISTAN, available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/wow/ (last visited Mar. 26, 
2005). In addition, see U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. GOVERNMENT IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 
CONTRACTS, available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/cba/iraq/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2005). 
2. One of the rare efforts to catalog contractor casualties suggests that approximately 
213 coalition contractor personnel have died in Iraq. See, e.g., IRAQ COALITION CASUALTY 
COUNT, IRAQ COALITION CASUALTIES: CONTRACTORS—A PARTIAL LIST, available at 
http://icasualties.org/oif/Civ.aspx (last visited Mar. 26, 2005). Most experts believe the 
actual number is significantly higher. 
3. The prosecutions of high-level government officials, including Darleen Druyun, 
Robert Neal, Richard Moran, and Kevin Marlowe, merit concern. Druyun, the former 
civilian chief of Air Force acquisition, pleaded guilty on April 20, 2004 to conspiracy to 
violate federal conflict-of-interest regulations, admitting that she engaged in job negotiations 
with Boeing while negotiating the high-profile $20 billion tanker lease deal with Boeing. 
Recently, after a polygraph test, she further admitted to helping Boeing obtain inflated prices 
on several deals, describing one as a “parting gift” made to curry favor with Boeing, her 
future employer. See George Cahlink, Deal Breaker, GOV’T EXECUTIVE, May 15, 2004, at 
19; Renae Merle & Jerry Markon, Ex-Air Force Official Gets Prison Time, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 2, 2004, at A1; Renae Merle & Jerry Markon, Ex-Pentagon Official Admits Job Deal; 
Civilian Got Boeing Offer While Overseeing Air-Tanker Contract, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 
2004, at A1. Neal, the former head of the Pentagon’s Office of Small and Disadvantaged 
Business Utilization, was convicted after being charged with conspiracy, extortion, money 
laundering, witness tampering, and obstruction of justice. See Jerry Markon, 2 Pentagon 
Officials Get 24 Years in Fraud, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 2003, at B3; Jerry Seper, Pentagon 
Ex-Officials Accused of Corruption, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2002, at A1. Moran, the former 
commander of the United States Army Contracting Command Korea (a position that allowed 
him to oversee more than $300 million worth of contracts), was indicted on July 3, 2002 for 
soliciting $850,000 worth of bribes from two South Korean companies. He pleaded guilty to 
two counts of conspiracy and one count of bribery. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
U.S. Army Colonel, Four Others Indicted in Scheme to Collect Bribes From South Korean 
Companies Seeking to Obtain Large Military Contracts (July 3, 2002), http://www.usdoj. 
gov/usao/cac/pr2002/103.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2005); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, U.S. Army Colonel Sentenced to Prison for Taking Bribes from South Korean 
Companies Seeking Military Contracts (June 9, 2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/cac/pr 
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they cannot be dismissed so easily as anomalies. 
The Abu Ghraib abuses suggest at least two matters that cry out for 
government-wide attention and intervention. First, the federal government must 
devote more resources to contract administration, management, and oversight. 
This investment is an urgent priority given the combination of the 1990s 
congressionally-mandated acquisition workforce reductions and the Bush 
administration’s relentless pressure to accelerate the outsourcing trend.4 
Second, the proliferation of interagency indefinite-delivery contract vehicles 
and the perverse incentives that derive from these fee-based purchasing 
vehicles have prompted troubling pathologies in public contracting that require 
correction and constraint. 
I. THE RUSH TO OUTSOURCE 
No one should be surprised to find contractors involved in almost every 
aspect of the U.S. government’s efforts in Iraq. No shortage of recent literature 
focuses upon the outsourcing phenomenon, particularly from a public policy 
perspective.5 Outsourcing, or its more palatable pseudonym, “competitive 
 
2003/088.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2005). Marlowe, a Defense Information Systems 
Agency senior contracting officer, was indicted for allegedly using a government purchase 
card to steer $11 million in business to a company in which he had a secret financial interest. 
In return, Marlowe and his family allegedly received $500,000 and other benefits from the 
company. See Katherine McIntire Peters, Senior Defense Contracting Officer, Three Others, 
Indicted for Corruption, GOV’T EXECUTIVE, Aug. 20, 2004, http://www.govexec.com/daily 
fed/0804/082004kp1.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2005); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Senior Government Official, Local Attorney and Others Charged in Defense Procurement 
Fraud Case (Aug. 18, 2004), http://www.dodig.osd.mil/IGInformation/IGInformation 
Releases/PR-Marlowe8_18_04.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2005). 
4. For a discussion of some of these issues at a more macro level, see, for example, 
Steven L. Schooner, Competitive Sourcing Policy: More Sail than Rudder, 33 PUB. CONT. 
L.J. 263 (2004); see also Dan Guttman, Governance by Contract: Constitutional Visions; 
Time for Reflection and Choice, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 321 (2004). 
5. See, e.g., PHILLIP J. COOPER, GOVERNING BY CONTRACT: CHALLENGES AND 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR PUBLIC MANAGERS (2003); MARKET BASED GOVERNANCE: SUPPLY SIDE, 
DEMAND SIDE, UPSIDE, AND DOWNSIDE (John D. Donahue & Joseph S. Nye, Jr. eds., 2002); 
THE PROCUREMENT REVOLUTION (Mark A. Abramson & Roland S. Harris III eds., 2003) 
(particularly chapters 1, 3, and 5-7). Recent symposia have grappled with a host of related 
issues. See, e.g., Symposium, Accountability and Democracy in the Era of Privatization, 28 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1319 (2001); Symposium, New Forms of Governance: Ceding Power to 
Private Actors, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1687 (2002); Single Subject Issue, Privatization and 
Outsourcing, 30 PUB. CONT. L.J. 551 (2001); Symposium, Public Values in an Era of 
Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1211 (2003). Scholars also have exposed more of the 
thorny issues implicated when governments, at the federal, state, and local level, rely on the 
private sector. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155 
(2000) (discussing accountability mechanisms in contracts and the conflict between public 
law norms and private law principles); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1371 (2003) (“[C]onstitutional law’s current approach to privatization 
is fundamentally inadequate in an era of increasingly privatized government.”); Sydney A. 
Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J. 389 (2003) (suggesting that 
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sourcing,” is one of five government-wide initiatives in the Bush management 
agenda.6 The administration has done little to mask its preference for 
outsourcing, aggressively relying on contractor personnel in lieu of government 
employees or soldiers.7 While fear of a public backlash may have slowed the 
administration’s domestic outsourcing efforts,8 New York Times columnist Paul 
 
governments employ a transaction cost or make-or-buy analysis in determining whether to 
outsource governmental regulation); Dru Stevenson, Privatization of Welfare Services: 
Delegation by Commercial Contract, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 83, 130 (2003) (“[I]n the debate about 
which government services are best-suited for private enterprise, . . . welfare services should 
be . . . last in line. The policy goals are simply too complex and, in a democratic society, 
conflicted.”). A wealth of contemporary comparative scholarship examines lessons learned 
from experiences outside the United States. See, e.g., Lauren Page Ambinder et al., The 
Mirage Becomes Reality: Privatization and Project Finance Developments in the Middle 
East Power Market, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1029 (2001); Alessandro Ancarani, The Impact 
of Public Firms Commercialisation on Purchasing Management, 3 J. PUB. PROCUREMENT 
357 (2003); Bernard Black et al., Russian Privatization & Corporate Governance: What 
Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1731 (2000); Ellen Dannin, To Market, To Market: 
Legislating on Privatization and Subcontracting, 60 MD. L. REV. 249, 249 n.a1 (2001) 
(containing a wealth of sources relating to privatization in New Zealand in the author’s 
biographical footnote); Hester Lessard, The Empire of the Lone Mother: Parental Rights, 
Child Welfare Law, and State Restructuring, 39 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 717 (2001); Ewell E. 
Murphy, Jr., The Prospect for Further Energy Privatization in Mexico, 36 TEX. INT’L L.J. 75 
(2001); Tony Prosser, Public Service Law: Privatization’s Unexpected Offspring, 63 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (2000); Yua Wei, Corporatization and Privatization: A Chinese 
Perspective, 22 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 219 (2002). 
6. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE 
PRESIDENT’S MANAGEMENT AGENDA: FISCAL YEAR 2002 4, 17-18 (2001), http://www.white 
house.gov/omb/budget/fy2002/mgmt.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2005). “President Bush is a 
major advocate of . . . hiring private firms to do the government’s work—and implemented 
this policy in Texas while he was governor . . . .” Stevenson, supra note 5, at 83 (citing 
David J. Kennedy, Due Process in a Privatized Welfare System, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 231, 232 
(1998) (“Governor Bush’s effort to privatize most of Texas’ welfare system, in turn, seemed 
rooted in his attempt to make a name for himself with the kind of bold experimentation that 
could carry him to national office.”)); see also Matthew Diller, Form and Substance in the 
Privatization of Property Programs, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1739, 1763 (2002) (“Governor Bush 
sought to hand the administration of the state’s welfare system over to . . . Lockheed 
Martin . . . and Electronic Data Systems . . . .”). 
7. The administration repeatedly offered eye-catching quotas for the number of 
government employees to be cut. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE 
OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2004 7, 39 
(2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2004/pdf/budget.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 
2005) (indicating that the Defense Department and the Department of Veterans Affairs 
planned to outsource 55,000 civilian positions in 2003); see also Christopher Lee, Army 
Outsourcing Plan Decried, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2002, at A4 (suggesting that the plan 
could affect more than one of every six Army jobs). 
8. Today, these quotas are unofficial and internal. See, e.g., Christopher Lee, OMB to 
Drop Quotas for Outsourcing of Jobs, WASH. POST, July 25, 2003, at A23 (noting that 
skeptics “said OMB officials could still impose de facto quotas by refusing to bless agency 
plans that do not meet the old goals”). Nonetheless, the quotas remain the policy’s primary 
purpose. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
COMPETITIVE SOURCING: REASONED AND RESPONSIBLE PUBLIC-PRIVATE COMPETITION: 
AGENCY ACTIVITIES: A SUPPLEMENT TO THE JULY 2003 REPORT (2003), http://www.white 
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Krugman aptly suggests that: 
in Iraq, where there is little public or congressional oversight, the 
administration has privatized everything in sight . . . . [Particularly shocking] 
is the privatization of purely military functions . . . . It’s one thing to have 
civilians drive trucks and serve food; it’s quite different to employ them as 
personal bodyguards to U.S. officials, as guards for U.S. government 
installations, and . . . as interrogators in Iraqi prisons.9 
Peter Singer, whose recent book Corporate Warriors10 has become 
required reading in light of the government’s practices in Iraq, raises similar 
policy concerns. In a Washington Post article, he noted: 
Confronting the problem of controlling private contractors requires 
challenging a common myth—that outsourcing saves money. This philosophy 
stems from a wide craze of privatizing government services that began long 
before President Bush took office. But hiring private employees in Iraq at pay 
rates several times more than what soldiers make, plus paying the overhead at 
the private firms, has never been about saving money. It’s more about 
avoiding tough political choices concerning military needs, reserve call-ups 
and the human consequences of war.11 
 
house.gov/omb/procurement/comp_sourc_addendum.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2005). Table 
1 details the “OMB Estimates of Commercial Activities at Agencies Tracked under the 
PMA” indicating each agency’s total workforce, the number of full-time-equivalents (FTEs) 
performing commercial activities, the total number of those FTEs available for competition, 
and the percentage of the total workforce that this number represents. See id. at 10. Various 
legislative initiatives have impeded implementation of the new rules. One of the most 
dramatic examples was the successful Van Hollen amendment to H.R. 2989, the 2004 
Transportation and Treasury Appropriation, which stated that “[n]one of the funds made 
available by this Act may be used to implement the revision to Office of Management and 
Budget Circular A-76 made on May 29, 2003.” 150 CONG. REC. H7138 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 
2004); see Christopher Lee, Competitive Sourcing Plan Hits Snag: House Votes Against 
Rules that Would Speed Up Competition for Federal Jobs, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2003, at 
A21. In late October, this matter went to conference after the Senate approved an 
amendment by Senator George Voinovich, which imposed a different set of constraints upon 
the A-76 process. Senate Votes to Allow Federal Workers to Protest A-76 Competitions in 
Funding Bill, 80 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) No.15, at 389 (Oct. 28, 2003); see also 
Truthfulness, Responsibility, and Accountability in Contracting Act (TRAC), H.R. 721, 
107th Cong. § 2 (Feb. 14, 2001) (intending to limit outsourcing until the costs and benefits 
were analyzed and garnering the support of 190 co-sponsors); OMB Urged to Halt NIH Job 
Competitions, 45 GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 436 (2003) (raising concerns that “this aggressive 
approach to Circular A-76 is undermining the advancement of science”). 
9. Paul Krugman, Battlefield of Dreams, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2004, at A29. 
10. P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY 
INDUSTRY (2003). 
11. P.W. Singer, The Contract the Military Needs to Break, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 
2004, at B3 (emphasis added). I agree with those who dismiss the optimistic projections of 
outsourcing-based savings, particularly because there is a dearth of empirical evidence 
linking potential savings with actual or historical savings. See, e.g., SUSAN M. GATES & 
ALBERT A. ROBBERT, RAND NAT’L DEFENSE RES. INST., PERSONNEL SAVINGS IN 
COMPETITIVELY SOURCED DOD ACTIVITIES: ARE THEY REAL? WILL THEY LAST? xiv (2000) 
(“[P]rojected personnel cost savings are substantial in both in-house and contractor wins [of 
sourcing contracts], ranging from 30 to 60 percent.”); Max B. Sawicky, Show Me the 
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In Iraq, our military relies upon contractor personnel not only for 
transportation, shelter, and food, but also for unprecedented levels of battlefield 
and weaponry operation, support, and maintenance.12 Accordingly, defense 
experts now recognize that, without contractors, our military simply cannot 
project its awesome technical superiority abroad. But highly publicized 
incidents of prisoner abuse raise fundamental questions particularly with regard 
to the tasking of contractor personnel and the oversight of their performance.13 
 
Money: Evidence Is Sorely Lacking that the Bush Administration’s Proposed A-76 Rules for 
Contracting Will Bring Budget Savings, ECON. POL’Y INST. BRIEFING PAPER (2003), 
http://www.epinet.org/briefingpapers/145/bp145.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2005) (asserting, 
among other things, that (1) the costs savings do not necessarily derive from examples that 
are representative of the types of work that may be contracted in the future; (2) the case 
studies were cherry-picked and, accordingly, provide better results than a random survey 
would reveal; and (3) the cost savings fail to recognize costs “shifted to other federal 
agencies or the taxpayer”). Moreover, the Defense Department Inspector General suggested 
that the pressure to outsource ultimately results in increased costs. See OFFICE OF THE 
INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT D-2000-088, DOD ACQUISITION WORKFORCE 
REDUCTION TRENDS AND IMPACTS 18 (2000) [hereinafter REPORT D-2000-088]; Keith 
Hartley, The Economics of Military Outsourcing, 11 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 287, 290 
(2002) (suggesting that transaction costs are “[a] central feature of outsourcing and the 
economics of contracting” and that “the transaction cost analysis shows that the costs of 
managing contracts, including arranging bids, monitoring outcomes, and taking legal action 
for contract failures, may offset any efficiency savings”); see also ELLIOTT D. SCLAR, YOU 
DON’T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU PAY FOR: THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATIZATION (2000). 
12. These services range from the huge Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 
(LOGCAP) contract with Halliburton subsidiary, Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR), to the 
security services provided by Blackwater for Ambassador Paul Bremer. See, e.g., ARMY 
MATERIAL COMMAND, LOGISTICS CIVIL AUGMENTATION PROGRAM, available at http://www. 
amc.army.mil/LOGCAP (last visited Mar. 26, 2005). Paul J. Kern describes the program: 
LOGCAP is about providing support to our troops and this support covers the full logistics 
spectrum. Some of the more critical functions include laundry and bath, facilities and 
billeting, clothing exchange and repair, waste and sanitation, food service, mortuary affairs, 
supply support, maintenance, transportation and distribution, and power generation and 
distribution to list but a few. 
The Complex Task of Coordinating Contracts Amid Chaos: The Challenges of Rebuilding a 
Broken Iraq: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 108th Cong. 3 (2004) 
(statement of Paul J. Kern, Commanding General, U.S. Army Material Command), 
http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Army%20Material%20-%20Kern%20Testimony.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2005); see also Website of Blackwater Security Consulting, available 
at http://www.blackwatersecurity.com/dospsd.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2005); Website of 
Blackwater USA, available at http://www.blackwaterusa.com/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2005). 
13. By no means have all of the legal issues associated with contractors on the 
battlefield been resolved. See, e.g., Brian H. Brady, Notice Provisions for United States 
Citizen Contractor Employees Serving with the Armed Forces of the United States in the 
Field: Time to Reflect Their Assimilated Status in Government Contracts?, 147 MIL. L. REV. 
1 (1995); Michael J. Davidson, Ruck Up: An Introduction to the Legal Issues Associated 
with Civilian Contractors on the Battlefield, 29 PUB. CONT. L.J. 233 (2000); Karen L. 
Douglas, Contractors Accompanying the Force: Empowering Commanders with Emergency 
Change Authority, 55 A.F. L. REV. 127 (2004); Hartley, supra note 11; Steven B. Hilkowitz, 
Contractors on the Battlefield, 44 CONT. MGMT. 24 (2004); James J. McCullough & 
Courtney J. Edmonds, Contractors on the Battlefield Revisited: The War in Iraq & Its 
Aftermath, 04-6 BRIEFING PAPERS 1 (May 2004); Todd S. Milliard, Overcoming Post-
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II. TROUBLING ANECDOTES FROM ABU GHRAIB 
The disturbing allegations of prisoner abuse at the Abu Ghraib prison 
become all the more unsettling because, unfortunately, they involve contractor 
personnel. The widely circulated Fay Report, which concludes that 
“[c]ontracting-related issues contributed to the problems at Abu Ghraib 
prison,”14 and the less well-known Interior Department Inspector General 
report are instructive in regard to the role of contractor personnel in and around 
the battle area.15 
The Army relied upon two relevant contractual agreements for operations 
at the Abu Ghraib prison: CACI International provided more than half of the 
interrogators employed at the facility,16 while Titan supplied linguistics 
personnel.17 General Fay’s assessment of the use of these contracts—and his 
conclusion that more than a third of the improper incidents involved contractor 
personnel—suggests the obvious: “The general policy of not contracting for 
intelligence functions and services was designed in part to avoid many of the 
problems that eventually developed at Abu Ghraib . . . .”18 
As a threshold issue, most observers (in or out of government) object, with 
good reason, to the use of contractors to perform interrogations, assuming that 
prisoner interrogation is an inherently governmental function: “Concern about 
which . . . activities are inherently governmental functions . . . goes back as far 
as the . . . discussion in the Federalist Papers among the framers of the 
Constitution over what functions are appropriate for the federal government to 
exercise.”19 Although the Fay Report does not seek to resolve this issue 
(instead suggesting that use of contractor personnel may be unavoidable in 
 
Colonial Myopia: A Call to Recognize and Regulate Private Military Companies, 176 MIL. 
L. REV. 1 (2003); Katherine McIntire Peters, Buck Private, GOV’T EXECUTIVE, Oct. 1, 2004, 
at 40; Rebecca Rafferty Vernon, Battlefield Contractors: Facing the Tough Issues, 33 PUB. 
CONT. L.J. 369 (2004). 
14. The 143-page report details the results of an Army inquiry into the role of military 
intelligence personnel in prisoner abuse at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. MG GEORGE R. 
FAY, AR 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE ABU GHRAIB DETENTION FACILITY AND 205TH 
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE 52 (2004) [hereinafter FAY REPORT], http://news.findlaw. 
com/nytimes/docs/dod/fay82504rpt.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2005). Granted, the contract-
related issues were but one of several institutional factors identified by the Fay Report, 
including a failure of leadership and confusion over interrogation procedures. See id. at 8. 
Ultimately, the report implicates both military personnel and civilian contractors, finding 
that more than 50 people had some degree of culpability for nearly four dozen instances of 
prisoner abuse occurring between July 2003 and February 2004. Id. at 7-8. 
15. Id. at 47-52; Memorandum from Earl Devaney, Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Interior, 
to Assistant Sec’y for Pol’y, Mgmt. & Budget (July 16, 2004) [hereinafter Interior IG 
Report], http://www.oig.doi.gov/upload/CACI%20LETTER3.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2005). 
16. FAY REPORT, supra note 14, at 48-49. 
17. Id. at 48. 
18. Id. at 49. 
19. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, GAO/GGD-92-11, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS: ARE SERVICE 
CONTRACTORS PERFORMING INHERENTLY GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS? 2 (1991). 
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“urgent or emergency situations”), this policy question offers a window into a 
long-running ad hoc battle over how our government serves the public.20 A 
deep chasm separates the putative government policy expressed in the recently 
revised OMB Circular A-7621—that the government should not compete with 
its citizens—and a regime in which the government competes with its citizens 
when monetary savings might result.22 
On a less philosophical level, the Fay Report leaves no doubt that some of 
the specific problems experienced in Abu Ghraib can be traced to insufficient 
contractor oversight.23 The Fay Report identified two main manifestations of 
the problem: a lack of training and inadequate contract management. 
According to the Report, as many as thirty-five percent of the interrogators 
supplied by CACI lacked formal military interrogation training.24 Even more 
troubling are the indications that CACI, in a rush to fill military demands for 
 
20. The battleground included the language in the revised OMB Circular A-76 and the 
implementation of the FAIR Act. See Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act, Pub. 
L. No. 105-270, 112 Stat. 2382 (1998); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF 
THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR NO. A-76 (REVISED), PERFORMANCE OF COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES 
(2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 32,134 (May 29, 2003) (reflecting the longstanding distinction between 
inherently governmental functions (which government employees must, or at least should, 
perform) and commercial activities (for which the private sector should be given the 
opportunity to compete)); see also OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, 2003 FAIR ACT INVENTORY USER’S GUIDE (2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
omb/procurement/fair/2003users_guide.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2005) (explaining that 
agencies must create inventories for Congress and the public “of all commercial activities 
performed by federal employees”). 
21. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR NO. A-76, supra note 21. 
22. Choosing between the labels “outsourcing” and “competitive sourcing” involves a 
significant policy decision, rather than mere semantics. In an outsourcing regime, 
government relies upon the private sector to perform its commercial activities. In other 
words, if the private sector can perform a task for the government, it should. Conversely, 
competitive sourcing permits existing government personnel (through the guise of a putative 
“most efficient organization” or MEO) to compete with the private sector to perform the 
same commercial activities. Under a competitive sourcing regime, the private sector only 
should perform commercial activities if cost savings are anticipated. 
23. FAY REPORT, supra note 14, at 49. Several other findings, with regard to the CACI 
contract, merit attention. First, a CACI employee participated with the contracting officer’s 
representative in writing the statement of work (SOW) prior to the award of the contract. As 
the Fay Report notes, such a practice—what appears to be an organizational conflict of 
interest (OCI)—appears to violate the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). See id.; see 
also FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 9.502-2 (2005). Second, it was unclear whether anyone in the Army’s 
contracting or legal organizations approved the use of the blanket purchase agreement 
(BPA). See FAY REPORT, supra note 14, at 49. Third, the Army general counsel’s office 
concluded in May of 2004 that these and other delivery orders for interrogator services were 
outside the scope of the GSA Schedule contract and should be cancelled. See id. at 48-49. 
24. The government has attempted to remedy some of these ills at Abu Ghraib. See, 
e.g., Ellen McCarthy, Changes Behind the Barbed Wire: New Standards Are in Place for the 
Oversight of Contract Workers at Abu Ghraib Prison, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 2004, at E01 
(“Fay said the Army is making changes recommended by his panel to ensure that civilian 
interrogators and contractors have qualifications and training equal to that of their military 
counterparts.”). 
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more personnel, failed to conduct adequate background investigations on 
prospective employees before hiring them. Lack of training was not only 
evident on the side of the contractors. Military personnel themselves did not 
have the necessary training in the area of contract administration to adequately 
monitor and oversee the contracts. If the Army plans to rely upon contractors to 
provide such sensitive services as translation and interrogation, it must 
maintain tight control over the operations. However, the small number of 
contracting officer representatives assigned to oversee the performance of 
hundreds of private employees made proper management virtually impossible. 
Additionally, as discussed below, confusion permeated Abu Ghraib with regard 
to who was supervising whom.25 
III. INADEQUATE CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION: A FALSE ECONOMY 
As the Fay Report gleaned from the Abu Ghraib experience, “it is very 
difficult, if not impossible, to effectively administer a contract when the COR 
[contracting officer’s representative]26 is not on site.”27 While this finding 
might appear obvious, the larger point cannot be avoided. If the government 
plans to rely heavily upon contractors, it must maintain, invest in, and apply 
appropriate acquisition professional resources to select, direct, and manage 
those contractors. Unfortunately, insufficient contract management resources 
have been applied in Iraq. General Fay poignantly articulated this point: 
Meaningful contract administration and monitoring will not be possible if a 
small number of CORs are asked to monitor the performance of one or more 
contractors who may have 100 or more employees in theater, and in some 
cases, perhaps in several locations . . . . [T]he CORs do well to keep up with 
the paper work, and simply have no time to actively monitor contractor 
performance. It is apparent that there was no credible exercise of appropriate 
oversight of contract performance at Abu Ghraib.28 
Long before the prison scandal led to increased scrutiny, the government’s 
failure to properly staff its contracts in Iraq was pervasive and well-known. 
Last year, there was every reason to fear that the government lacked adequate 
 
25. See infra notes 47-50. 
26. “‘Contracting officer’ means a person with the authority to enter into, administer, 
and/or terminate contracts . . . . The term includes certain authorized representatives of the 
[CO] acting within the limits of their authority as delegated by the [CO].” FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 
2.101 (2005). “[CO]s are responsible for ensuring performance of all necessary actions for 
effective contracting, ensuring compliance with the terms of the contract, and safeguarding 
the interests of the United States in its contractual relationships.” 48 C.F.R. § 1.602-2. 
27. FAY REPORT, supra note 14, at 50 (footnote added). The Fay Report later reiterated 
that “[a]n important step in precluding the recurrence of [these types] of situations . . . is to 
insure that a properly trained COR is on site.” Id. at 52. 
28. Id. at 52 (emphasis added). The report states what common sense dictates: “Failure 
to assign an adequate number of CORs to the area of contract performance puts the Army at 
risk of being unable to control poor performance or become aware of possible misconduct by 
contractor personnel.” Id. 
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resources on the ground in Iraq to properly manage and administer its 
contractual undertaking. Few doubted that the government lacked sufficient 
personnel and mechanisms to ensure appropriate oversight of this massive 
contracting enterprise.29 Sadly, a steady stream of empirical research confirms 
the worst. Recent audits of Iraqi and U.S. funds awarded by the Coalition 
Provisional Authority reveal the gross inadequacies underlying contract 
management and administration for Iraqi reconstruction.30 
Unfortunately, this problem is not unique to the Iraq contracting process.31 
The federal government currently lacks sufficient numbers of qualified 
acquisition professionals to conduct appropriate market research, properly plan 
acquisitions, maximize competition, comply with a plethora of congressionally 
imposed social policies, administer contracts to assure quality control and 
guarantee contract compliance, resolve pending protests and disputes, and close 
 
29. The Defense Department was not alone in lacking sufficient resources to manage 
its requirements in Iraq. See, e.g., Jeffrey Marburg-Goodman, USAID’s Iraq Procurement 
Contracts: An Insider’s View, PROCUREMENT LAW, Fall 2003, at 10. Explaining the 
compromises required during a crisis, Marburg-Goodman notes:  
[The FAR] constitutes the most complex, yet also the most transparent, government 
purchasing code in the world. Still, the success it ensures for fundamental fairness, 
transparency, and maximum competitive benefit is normally achieved at considerable costs 
in time and staffing effort . . . . There is a tremendous tension between this purposely 
deliberate and unhurried process and the occasional emergency needs of a government 
agency. 
Id. 
30. See, e.g., OPEN SOCIETY INST., REVENUE WATCH: REPORT NO. 7, DISORDER, 
NEGLIGENCE AND MISMANAGEMENT: HOW THE CPA HANDLED IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDS 
(2004), http://www.iraqrevenuewatch.org/reports/092404.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2005). 
As of April 12, 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) had awarded a staggering 
$847 million worth of contracts to be paid for by the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI), a 
fund made up of earnings from the sale of Iraq’s oil and gas. Id. at 7. “Although the CPA 
was required to manage the DFI in a transparent manner, it chose not to apply the same 
standards that apply to U.S. funds.” Id. at 3. Apparently, this decision was based on “the 
‘wide uses’ of DFI along with environmental factors unique to Iraq.” Id. Even under the 
more stringent procedures mandated for the allocation of U.S. money, poor contractual 
oversight and management are prevalent. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that when 
operating under less transparent standards, the CPA failed to properly award and monitor its 
contracts: 
The CPA Contracting activity had not issued standard operating procedures or developed an 
effective contract review, tracking, and monitoring system. In addition, contract files were 
missing and incomplete. Further, contracting officers did not always ensure that contract 
prices were fair and reasonable, contractors were capable of meeting delivery schedules, and 
payments were made in accordance with contract requirements. 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTH., REPORT NO. 04-013, COALITION 
PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY’S CONTRACTING PROCESSES LEADING UP TO AND INCLUDING 
CONTRACT AWARD (2004). For a list of agencies that oversee spending on Iraqi 
reconstruction, see OPEN SOCIETY INST., supra, at 13-15. 
31. “For insiders in the corridors of the Pentagon, the pervasive role of contractors in 
the replacement of civil servants is a given.” Dan Guttman, The Shadow Pentagon: Private 
Contractors Play a Huge Role in Basic Government Work—Mostly Out of Public View 
(Sept. 29, 2004), at http://www.publicintegrity.org/pns/printer-friendly.aspx?aid=386 (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2005). 
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out contracts.32 
This point bears emphasis for two reasons. First, the GAO’s33 “prior work 
has shown that when workforce reductions do not consider future needs—such 
as the staff reduction at DoD [Department of Defense] during the 1990s—the 
result is a workforce that is not balanced with regard to experience and skill 
sets.”34 Frankly, the government did not have enough qualified contracts 
professionals to meet its needs before the events of September 11th. Since that 
time, despite a dramatic spike in procurement spending for homeland security 
and military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the federal government has 
failed to engage in a meaningful effort to recruit the staff necessary to manage 
the government’s increased contracting burdens. 
Second, given the administration’s competitive sourcing initiative, the 
most rapidly growing area of procurement activity lies in service contracting.35 
Successful service contracts are difficult to draft and, more importantly, require 
significant resources to administer or manage. Thus: “The extent of reliance on 
service contractors is not by itself a cause for concern. Agencies must, however, 
have a sufficient number of trained and experienced staff to manage 
Government programs properly. The greater the degree of reliance on 
contractors the greater the need for oversight by agencies.”36 
 
32. See generally Steven L. Schooner, Fear of Oversight: The Fundamental Failure of 
Businesslike Government, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 627 (2001) [hereinafter Schooner, Fear of 
Oversight] (discussing reduced oversight in government procurement throughout the 1990s). 
Last year, the GAO conceded that the acquisition workforce has declined dramatically, while 
“all agencies face the prospect of losing many of their skilled acquisition personnel over the 
next 5 years—with a significant portion of the government’s acquisition workforce 
becoming eligible to retire by fiscal year 2008.” GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, GAO-03-443, FEDERAL 
PROCUREMENT: SPENDING AND WORKFORCE TRENDS (2003) [hereinafter GAO-03-443]; see 
also REPORT D-2000-088, supra note 11. 
33. Recently Congress changed the name of the General Accounting Office (GAO) to 
the Government Accountability Office. GAO Human Capital Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. 
No. 108-271, § 8(a), 118 Stat. 811, 814 (2004); see also GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, GAO’S NAME 
CHANGE AND OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE GAO HUMAN CAPITAL REFORM ACT, available at 
http://www.gao.gov/about/namechange.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2005) (noting that the 
name change “better reflects the modern professional services organization GAO has 
become”). 
34. GAO-03-443, supra note 33, at 22 (citing inter alia GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, GAO-01-
753T, CONTRACT MANAGEMENT: TRENDS AND CHALLENGES IN ACQUIRING SERVICES (2001)). 
35. The government has failed to fully recognize, let alone adapt to, its increasing 
reliance on service contracts. The increase is dramatic. See, e.g., COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES 
PANEL, IMPROVING THE SOURING DECISIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT 27 fig. 5 (2002), 
http://www.gao.gov/a76panel/dcap0201.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2005) (demonstrating that, 
between 1986 and 2001, the percentage of federal procurement dollars devoted to service 
contracting rose from 31% to 51% of total procurement spending); see also Larry Makinson, 
Outsourcing the Pentagon: Who Benefits from the Politics and Economics of National 
Security?, available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/pns/report.aspx?aid=385 (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2005) (showing in the figure, “The Switch to Services: Defense Contracting, 1984-
2003,” the growth of services as a percentage of total defense contracts). 
36. Policy Letter 92-1 from Office of Fed. Procurement Pol’y (OFPP), to the Heads of 
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Currently, there are inadequate personnel resources, and insufficient 
investment has been made to train existing personnel in required skills (such as 
drafting performance-based statements of work).37 In other words, the critical 
acquisition workforce problems will get worse before they get better. 
Demands upon overtaxed acquisition corps lead to a triage-type focus on 
buying, which has severely limited the resources available for post-award 
contract administration. Agencies must apply their limited resources to meet 
their most pressing needs.38 In other words, buyers face enormous pressure to 
fill vacant seats with bodies. When faced with applying limited resources, 
agencies focus first upon awarding contracts and less upon administering those 
contracts once awarded. To be clear—the government lacks the procurement 
professionals needed to manage the contractors that continue to replace 
outsourced government personnel. Steve Kelman, one of the chief architects of 
the 1990s acquisition reforms, now concedes that “the administration of 
contracts once they have been signed has been the neglected stepchild of [the 
procurement system reform] effort.”39 More broadly, the cuts diminished 
internal (or government) oversight of the contracting process,40 limiting the 
 
Executive Agencies and Departments § (7)(h) (Sept. 23, 1992), http://www.arnet.gov/Librar 
y/OFPP/PolicyLetters/Letters/PL92-1.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2005) (emphasis added). 
37. The Commercial Activities Panel found: 
[D]ownsizing was not guided by strategic planning, nor has adequate consideration been 
given to implementation challenges, such as the impact of the government’s reduction-in-
force rules. Overall, the government’s human resources policies and practices have not 
reflected, nor been aligned with, current workforce dynamics and challenges, including 
demographics, professional development, mobility, and other issues. 
COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES PANEL, supra note 35, at 28. 
38. Joseph A. Pegnato, Federal Workforce Downsizing During the 1990s: A Human 
Capital Disaster, 32 PUB. MANAGER 26, 29 (Winter 2003-04) (“Some of the adverse impacts 
associated with the workload imbalance include more time to award contracts, increased 
program costs, insufficient staff to manage requirements, increased backlog of contracts to 
close out, and personnel retention difficulty.”); see also Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, 
Contracting Out Procurement Functions: The “Inherently Governmental Function” 
Exception, 14 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 45 (2000) (wondering “whether some agencies have 
enough personnel left in-house”). 
39. “The most fundamental problem with the current system is that it insufficiently 
recognizes contract administration as in the first instance a management function.” Steven 
Kelman, Strategic Contracting Management, in MARKET BASED GOVERNANCE, supra note 5, 
at 89-90, 93 (referring to the “hollow state” while citing inter alia DONALD F. KETTL, 
GOVERNMENT BY PROXY: (MIS?)MANAGING FEDERAL PROGRAMS (1988)). 
40. Schooner, Fear of Oversight, supra note 32, at 671-72 (including the graphic on 
page 672). Between 1990 and 1999, the number of accounting and budget personnel within 
the acquisition workforce fell from 17,504 to 6432, a decrease of 63%. The cumulative 
reduction in these specialties is more dramatic because these figures exclude the Defense 
Contract Audit Agency, whose staffing decreased from 7030 work years in FY 1990 to 3958 
in FY 1999, a reduction of about 43%. Further, during the same period, the number of 
quality assurance, inspection, and grading personnel fell from 12,117 to 5191, a decrease of 
57%. Id.; see also RICHARD J. STILLMAN II, THE AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY: THE CORE OF 
MODERN GOVERNMENT 307-09 (2d ed. 1996) (suggesting that the growth of contracting out 
has “tended to accelerate numerous problems and dilemmas of managerial efficiency, 
UNPAGINATED VERSION FOR UNOFFICIAL USE PLEASE CITE 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 549 (2005) 
2005] CONTRACTOR ATROCITIES AT ABU GHRAIB 13 
government’s insight into how its contractors perform. 
This scenario thus hides significant downstream costs and potential 
performance failures. In Iraq (and, ultimately, throughout the government), it is 
time to make meaningful investments in restoring, expanding, training, and 
incentivizing the acquisition workforce. A related concern arises with regard to 
the proliferation of personal services contracts. 
IV. PERSONAL SERVICES CONTRACTS: GOVERNMENT DEPENDENCE ON 
EMPLOYEE AUGMENTATION 
As the administration pursued its outsourcing agenda, it ignored the long-
standing congressional prohibitions against personal services contracting. 
Government procurement law, policy, and practice distinguish contracts for 
services (ranging from custodial or clerical to medical) from those for supplies 
(including end items or widgets ranging from furniture to fighter aircraft) and 
construction (including designing, building, repairing structures, or generally 
improving real estate).41 Service contracts are further distinguished as personal 
and nonpersonal service contracts. In a nonpersonal services contract, the 
government delegates a function to a contractor. Conversely, in personal 
services contracts, the government retains the function, but contractor 
employees staff the effort.42 
The government operates under longstanding legal and policy objections to 
the use of personal services contracts.43 Yet an increasingly common form of 
personal services contract is the body shop or employee augmentation 
arrangement.44 As the name implies, the government uses this type of contract 
to hire contractor personnel to replace, supplement, or work alongside civil 
servants or members of the armed forces. This is the antithesis of the 
government’s preferred approach, known as performance-based service 
contracting (PBSC).45 As a matter of practice and necessity, however, the 
 
oversight, and accountability”). 
41. A service contract “directly engages the time and effort of a contractor whose 
primary purpose is to perform an identifiable task rather than to furnish an end item of 
supply.” FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 37.101 (2005) (emphasis added). 
42. “‘Nonpersonal services contract’ means a contract under which the personnel 
rendering the services are not subject, either by the contract’s terms or by the manner of its 
administration, to the supervision and control usually prevailing in relationships between the 
Government and its employees.” 48 C.F.R. § 37.101. “A personal services contract is 
characterized by the employer-employee relationship it creates between the Government and 
the contractor’s personnel.” 48 C.F.R. § 37.104(a). 
43. The basic procurement regulation explains that “[a]gencies shall not award 
personal services contracts unless specifically authorized by statute . . . to do so.” 48 C.F.R. 
§ 37.104(b). 
44. This poses an interesting pedagogical challenge in the law school classroom, at 
least until the statutes and regulations are amended to conform to current practice. 
45. 48 C.F.R. § 37.102(a) (1983) (citing Pub. L. No. 106-398, § 821 and cross-
referencing 40 U.S.C. §§ 541-544). See generally Policy Letter 91-2, from Office of Fed. 
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federal government today relies heavily upon employee augmentation 
contracts.46 The experience in Iraq is not dramatically different from what 
occurs daily in government offices and organizations across the United States. 
Civil servants work alongside, with, and at times, for, contractor employees 
who sit in seats previously occupied by government employees. But no one 
stopped to train the government workforce on how to operate in such an 
environment. For example, the Fay Report notes that the use of contractor 
personnel, “hired in an attempt to address shortfalls,” contributed to the lack of 
unit integrity in the Joint Interrogation and Detention Center (JIDC), which the 
Report described as a “fatal flaw.”47 
One of the most troubling aspects of using contractor personnel to augment 
government personnel shortfalls is that, all too often, the contractor personnel 
lack appropriate training to replace government personnel, and government 
personnel lack appropriate training to supervise the contractor personnel. 
Another indication of the apparent inadequacy of on-site contract management 
and lack of contract training is the apparent lack of understanding of the 
appropriate relationship between contractor personnel, government civilian 
 
Procurement Pol’y, to the Heads of Executive Agencies and Departments (Apr. 9, 1991), 
[hereinafter OFPP Policy Letter 91-2] http://www.arnet.gov/Library/OFPP/PolicyLetters/ 
Letters/PL91-2_4-9-91.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2005) (commencing the government’s 
initiative officially). In addition, see GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, GAO-02-1049, CONTRACT 
MANAGEMENT: GUIDANCE NEEDED FOR USING PERFORMANCE-BASED SERVICE CONTRACTING 
1 (2002) (“To achieve greater cost savings and better outcomes . . ., the Congress and the 
administration have encouraged greater use of performance-based service contracting.”). 
Performance-based service contracting (PBSC) emphasizes that all aspects of an acquisition 
be structured around the purpose of the work to be performed as opposed to the manner in 
which the work is to be performed . . . . It is designed to ensure that contractors are given 
freedom to determine how to meet the Government’s performance objectives, that 
appropriate performance quality levels are achieved, and that payment is made only for 
services that meet these levels. 
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF FED. PROCUREMENT POL’Y, A GUIDE TO BEST 
PRACTICES FOR PERFORMANCE-BASED SERVICE CONTRACTING 4 (1998) [hereinafter BEST 
PRACTICES GUIDE], http://www.arnet.gov/Library/OFPP/BestPractices/PPBSC/BestPPBSC. 
html (last visited Mar. 26, 2005). “Agencies shall, to the maximum extent practicable, 
describe the work in terms of ‘what’ is to be the required output rather than ‘how’ the work 
is to be accomplished.” OFPP Policy Letter 91-2, supra, § 5(a). “The PBSC [work 
statement] describes the effort in terms of measurable performance standards (outputs). 
These standards should include such elements as ‘what, when, where, how many, and how 
well’ the work is to be performed.” BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra, at 7; see also OFFICE OF 
DEPUTY UNDER SEC’Y OF DEF. FOR ACQUISITION REFORM, PERFORMANCE-BASED SERVICE 
ACQUISITION 11 (2001), http://www.dau.mil/pubs/misc/pbsa.asp (last visited Mar. 26, 2005). 
46. This reliance is driven by the juxtaposition of two trends: (1) increased 
government downsizing and (2) the targeted acquisition workforce reductions discussed 
above. 
47. FAY REPORT, supra note 14, at 9. The government’s failure to train its workforce to 
operate in such a fluid, highly integrated environment concerns the nation’s public policy 
schools and scholars who study the “new public management.” See, e.g., John Forrer & 
James Edwin Kee, Public Servants as Contract Managers?, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 361 (2004). 
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employees, and military personnel.48 
More specifically, the Fay Report found that “[n]o training is conducted at 
any level . . . on the employment of contract interrogators in military 
operations . . . . [The government’s] interrogators, analysts, and leaders were 
unprepared for the arrival of contract interrogators and had no training to fall 
back on in the management, control, and discipline of these personnel.”49 
Moreover, within Abu Ghraib, it appears that the parties involved lacked a 
sense “of the appropriate relationship between contractor personnel, 
government civilian employees, and military personnel. Several people 
indicated . . . that contractor personnel were ‘supervising’ government 
personnel or vice versa.”50 This confusion demonstrates the very scenario that 
the personal services prohibition was intended to avoid.51 
The worst-case scenario arises where a contractor performs work under an 
open-ended contract (for example, with a vague or ambiguous statement of 
work) without guidance or management from a responsible government official 
(for example, in the absence of an administrative contracting officer or a 
contracting officer’s representative).52 The Fay investigation did well to draw 
 
48. FAY REPORT, supra note 14, at 51. 
49. Id. at 19. Nor was there an established curriculum from which the government 
could have drawn for its training. The Fay Report found: 
No doctrine exists to guide interrogators and their intelligence leaders . . . in . . . contract 
management or command and control of contractors in a wartime environment. These 
interrogators and leaders faced numerous issues involving contract management: roles and 
responsibilities of [government] personnel with respect to contractors; roles, relationships, 
and responsibilities of contract[or personnel] . . . with military personnel; and the methods of 
disciplining contractor personnel . . . . 
Id. Moreover, there was no standardization of the contractor interrogator training. To the 
extent that the contract required that contractor personnel have training equivalent to 
government interrogators, “no one was monitoring the contractor’s decision as to what was 
considered ‘equivalent.’” Id. at 51. 
50. Id. at 51. For example, the Fay Report identifies two organization charts that listed 
contractor employee supervisors with military subordinates. Id. at 52. 
51. The regulatory regime anticipates that government personnel manage contracts but 
do not directly supervise individual contractor employees; nor do contractor employees 
directly report to government personnel. For various reasons, including standards of conduct 
and compensation regimes, contractor personnel differ from civil servants. “The 
Government is normally required to obtain its employees by direct hire under competitive 
appointment or other procedures required by the civil service laws. Obtaining personal 
services by contract, rather than by direct hire, circumvents those laws unless Congress has 
specifically authorized acquisition of the services by contract.” FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 37.104(a) 
(2005). 
52. A simple example illustrating this principle can be found in the BTG/Titan 
contract for linguists. Because the purpose of the contract was to provide linguists, the 
contract does not contemplate that contractor personnel might conduct interrogations. 
Accordingly, nothing in the contract required BTG/Titan personnel to review or sign the 
interrogation rules of engagement. FAY REPORT, supra note 14, at 48. The report continues: 
Proper oversight did not occur at Abu Ghraib due to a lack of training and inadequate 
contract management and monitoring. Failure to assign an adequate number of CORs to the 
area of contract performance puts the Army at risk of being unable to control poor 
performance or become aware of possible misconduct by contractor personnel. . . . The Army 
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attention to the oversight vacuum. It is troubling to learn that the officer in 
charge of interrogations received no parameters or guidance for use of 
contractor personnel, was unfamiliar with the contract’s terms and procedures, 
made no mention of a government contracting officer’s representative, and 
understood her primary point of contact to be the contractor’s on-site 
manager.53 Sadly, this scenario is all too common today. 
V. FLEXIBLE FEE-BASED ACQUISITION INSTRUMENTS: UNANTICIPATED 
EXTERNALITIES 
These problems are exacerbated by the proliferation of fee-based 
arrangements that permit government agencies to avoid longstanding 
contracting constraints by off-loading their procurement function to other 
agencies. No doubt, most Americans are surprised to learn that the military 
relied upon the Department of the Interior’s National Business Center (NBC)54 
to procure contractor personnel to conduct interrogations in Iraq and 
Guantanamo Bay.55 
Yet it is no surprise that problems continue to arise under these immensely 
popular, highly-flexible contractual vehicles—indefinite-delivery/indefinite-
quantity (ID/IQ) contracts. While these vehicles undoubtedly streamline the 
procurement process, concerns regarding their misuse are neither new nor 
novel.56 Numerous GAO and IG reports disclose agency practices in awarding 
 
needs to take a much more aggressive approach to contract administration and management 
if interrogator services are to be contracted . . . . 
Id. at 52. 
53. Id. at 50. 
54. It is difficult to get a sense of the mission, purpose, or mandate of the National 
Business Center (NBC). For example, a visit to the NBC’s website indicates that its new or 
expanded customers include: (1) the Public Defender Service of the District of Columbia 
(PDS), a federally funded, independent agency of the District of Columbia; (2) the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), a new government corporation, which provides 
U.S. foreign development assistance to countries that adopt pro-growth strategies for 
meeting political, social, and economic challenges; and (3) the African Development 
Foundation (ADF), a government corporation, which provides small grants directly to 
private organizations in Africa to carry out sustainable self-help development activities in an 
environmentally sound manner. See generally Website of National Business Center, at 
http://www.nbc.gov (last visited Mar. 26, 2005). Like a commercial firm, to the extent that 
“[t]he NBC operates on a full cost-recovery business basis,” it must generate fees. Id. at 
Overview. Unlike a commercial firm, one might expect its ultimate purpose to derive from a 
congressional authorization in some way related to the Interior. 
55. Interior IG Report, supra note 15, at 3. The Guantanamo Bay effort involved 
“intelligence analysis and strategic debriefing services” with regard to the approximately 
600 people detained during the government’s military action in Afghanistan. Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). 
56. See, e.g., Michael J. Benjamin, Multiple Award Task and Delivery Order 
Contracts: Expanding Protest Grounds and Other Heresies, 31 PUB. CONT. L.J. 429 (2002); 
Karen DaPonte Thornton, Fine Tuning Acquisition Reform’s Favorite Procurement Vehicle, 
the Indefinite Delivery Contract, 31 PUB. CONT. L.J. 383 (2002). 
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task and delivery order contracts which, almost uniformly, include insufficient 
competition and poorly justified sole-source awards.57 In principle, contractors 
are supposed to compete to become part of an “umbrella contract,” which 
offers them little more than the opportunity to compete for individual task or 
delivery orders. Unfortunately, the anticipated competition rarely materializes; 
agencies tend to include all comers on the contract vehicle. This makes sense, 
to the extent that inclusion on the contract is no more than an opportunity to 
compete, akin to a “hunting license.” Yet real competition also proves absent 
during the task-order stage. Because all “contract holders” may market their 
services directly to individual agencies, those agencies—affected by 
considerations including speed, convenience, personal preference, and human 
nature—frequently obtain those services on a sole source or noncompetitive 
basis from those possessing these hunting licenses. As a result, legitimate 
competition infrequently materializes.58 
Moreover, as the Interior Department Inspector General (IG) concluded in 
this case, the pursuit of fees distorts the moral compass that we would 
otherwise hope to animate federal government procurement officials. The 
Interior IG correctly perceived the “[i]nherent conflict in a fee-for-service 
operation, where procurement personnel in the eagerness to enhance 
organization revenues have found shortcuts to Federal procurement procedures 
and procured services for clients whose own agencies might not do so.”59 
This point merits elaboration. The federal procurement statutes and 
regulations assume a model in which agencies rely upon warranted purchasing 
professionals to procure their needed supplies and services.60 This longstanding 
arrangement bifurcates programmatic authority from procurement authority—
in other words, program or project managers (PMs) must rely upon contracting 
officers (COs) to fulfill their requirements. Our procurement regime assumes 
that COs will be familiar with, understand, and follow congressional mandates 
and effectuate the government’s procurement policies in making these 
purchases. Contracting officers are expected to meet the PM’s needs, but only 
 
57. Section 803 of the 2002 Defense Authorization Act was intended to rein in some 
of these practices. See Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Competition 
Requirements for Purchase of Services Under Multiple Award Contracts, 67 Fed. Reg. 
15,351 (Apr. 1, 2002) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 208 and 216); Defense Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Competition Requirements for Purchase of Services 
Under Multiple Award Contracts, 67 Fed. Reg. 65,505 (Oct. 25, 2002) (to be codified at 48 
C.F.R. pts. 208 and 216). “It remains to be seen, however, whether these new regulations 
will enhance competition because agencies often have disregarded the existing FAR 
provisions . . . .” Steven N. Tomanelli, Feature Comment: New Law Aims to Increase 
Competition for and Oversight of DOD’s Purchases of Services on Multiple Award 
Contracts, 44 GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 107 (2002). 
58. See generally GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-00-56, CONTRACT MANAGEMENT: 
FEW COMPETING PROPOSALS FOR LARGE DOD INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ORDERS 4 (2000). 
59. Interior IG Report, supra note 15, at 3. 
60. See, e.g., FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 1.6 (2005). 
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within the established constraints of the procurement system. 
Unfortunately, perverse incentives associated with flexible, interagency, 
fee-based acquisition vehicles turn this system on its head. Various statutory 
schemes, dating back to the Economy Act,61 permit interagency transfers,62 
such as allowing one agency to conduct a purchase for another.63 Of particular 
relevance here, the Clinger-Cohen Act64 resulted in a proliferation of 
government-wide acquisition contracts, popularly known as GWACs.65 While 
the Economy Act authorizes interagency transfers, the statute “permit[s] an 
agency to take advantage of another agency’s expertise, not merely to offload 
work, funds, or both to avoid legislative restrictions.”66 One of the most 
common violations of this prohibition is “parking” funds before they expire.67 
As the end of the fiscal year approaches, agencies “park” or “dump” funds68 by 
 
61. In 1932, Congress intended the Economy Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1535-1536 (2005), to 
generate economies of scale by reducing redundant activities of many government agencies. 
62. See, e.g., Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (FPASA), 40 U.S.C. § 
481(a)(3) (2005); Project Order Statute, 41 U.S.C. § 23 (2005). 
63. Within the Defense Department, interagency orders typically are executed by 
issuing a DD Form 448, Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request (MIPR), http://web1. 
whs.osd.mil/forms/DD0448.PDF (last visited Mar. 26, 2005). 
64. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 
5112(e), 110 Stat. 186 (1996) (codified at 40 U.S.C. § 1412(e) (2005)). The Federal 
Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) and the Information Technology Management and Reform 
Act (ITMRA) were renamed as the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996. 
65. Government-wide acquisition contract (GWAC) is a task-order or delivery-order 
contract for information technology established by one agency for government-wide use that 
is operated (1) by an executive agent designated by OMB pursuant to the Clinger-Cohen Act 
§ 5112(e), 40 U.S.C. § 11302(e) (2005) or (formerly) (2) under a Brooks Act delegation, 40 
U.S.C. § 759 (repealed by Pub. L. No. 104-106). The Economy Act does not apply to orders 
against GWACs. FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (2005). Pursuant to § 5112(e) the OMB Director 
designated GSA as the executive agent for certain government-wide acquisitions of 
information technology (IT). The scope of the designation is limited to programs funded on 
a reimbursable basis through the Information Technology Fund established by 40 U.S.C. § 
322 (2005). These programs include the Federal Systems Integration and Management 
Center (FEDSIM) and the Federal Computer Acquisition Center (FEDCAC), as well as 
other existing government-wide IT acquisition programs. The OMB designation, in 
combination with 40 U.S.C. § 322, provides separate authority for acquisition from these 
GSA programs and states that the “Treasury and Information Technology Fund [hereinafter 
the Fund] . . . shall be available without fiscal year limitation.” 
66. STEVEN N. TOMANELLI, APPROPRIATIONS LAW: PRINCIPLES & PRACTICE 371 (2003). 
67. At the end of the fiscal year, appropriated but unobligated annual funds expire or 
“cease to be available for . . . new obligations.” These funds then reside in an “expired 
account” for five years during which time they are available to “liquidate obligations 
properly chargeable to the account prior to its expiration.” Afterwards, the expired account is 
closed and the unexpended balance returns to the general fund of the Treasury (which, in 
reality, is a mere bookkeeping adjustment, since the money “never [left] the Treasury to 
begin with”). GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL 
APPROPRIATIONS LAW 5-67 to 5-73 (3d ed. 2004). 
68. For example, fearing that some of its appropriated funds might expire before the 
end of the fiscal year (and thus be lost to it forever), a hypothetical agency (A) might 
“spend” its remaining appropriation by transferring it into agency B’s revolving fund. The 
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issuing open-ended or vague orders that do not state a specific and definite 
requirement69 or identify a bona fide need.70 However, the Economy Act (or 
similar inter-agency purchasing regimes)71 was not intended to facilitate the 
avoidance of competition.72 
The problem arises because fee-based purchasing offices (for example, the 
servicing agency) need revenue to survive.73 In other words, revolving funds 
 
receiving agency (B) then holds or parks the funds in its revolving fund, where the funds do 
not expire with the fiscal year’s conclusion. Subsequently, consistent with A’s wishes, B 
retains and reimburses a contractor (out of the revolving fund, using what otherwise would 
be expired funds) to perform services for A. A is pleased to receive services that, pursuant to 
conventional fiscal law, it could not afford to purchase. B willingly obliges A because B 
skims an administrative or franchise fee off the top of the transaction which, in turn, funds 
(or potentially grows) B’s operations. See, e.g., Implementation of the Library of Congress 
FEDLINK Revolving Fund, Comp. Gen. B-288142 (Sept. 6, 2001); Continued Availability 
of Expired Appropriation for Additional Project Phases, Comp. Gen. B-286929 (Apr. 25, 
2001) [hereinafter B-286929]; see also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT 
NO. D-2002-109, ACQUISITION: ARMY CLAIMS SERVICE MILITARY INTERDEPARTMENTAL 
PURCHASE REQUESTS (2002) (discussing the U.S. Army Claims Service’s (USACS) potential 
Anti-Deficiency Act violations related to USACS’s transactions with the General Services 
Administration Information Technology Fund). 
69. Such general orders (e.g., “provide 100 personal computers”) may not be 
sufficiently definite to satisfy the specificity requirements for recording obligations. “An 
amount shall be recorded as an obligation . . . only when supported by documentary 
evidence of . . . a binding agreement . . . that is . . . executed before the end of the period of 
availability . . . for specific goods to be delivered . . . .” 31 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(1)(B) (2005) 
(emphasis added). Failure to create a recordable obligation prior to the funds’ expiration 
should render those funds unavailable thereafter (once the requirement is better defined). 
70. Problems arise because the general requirements found in parked orders often fail 
to represent a bona fide need of the ordering agency at the time the order is issued. The 
problem arises because, despite the IT fund’s statutory no-year limitation, the ordering 
agencies’ appropriations remain subject to their original congressionally mandated periods 
of availability. Thus, an ordering agency cannot cite expired funds on its order under 
FEDSIM or FEDCAC. See B-286929, supra note 69, where GAO held: “as with other 
contractual obligations, once the agency liquidates the obligation, any remaining balances 
are not available to enter into a new obligation after the account has expired (i.e., if fiscal 
year funds, after the end of the fiscal year).” 
71. “The Economy Act applies when more specific statutory authority does not exist.” 
FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 17.500(b) (2005); see also In re Interagency Agreement—Administrative 
Office of the U.S. Courts, 55 Comp. Gen. 1497 (1976) (finding the Economy Act is not the 
only authority permitting interagency agreements, and it controls “[i]n the absence of other 
statutory authority”). But, in this case, the Brooks Act provided independent authority for the 
procurement of automated data processing (ADP, today known as information technology or 
IT) equipment. Id. 
72. In Valenzuela Eng’g, Inc., B-277979, Jan. 26, 1998, 98-1 CPD ¶ 51, the GAO 
explained that, while Economy Act transactions generally are exempted from the 
competition mandates in the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA), 10 U.S.C. § 
2304(c)(5) (2005), that is true only where the agency receiving the Economy Act order has 
complied fully with CICA requirements. See also 10 U.S.C. § 2304(f)(5)(B) (2005); 
Dictaphone Corp., B-244691.2, Nov. 25, 1992, 92-2 CPD ¶ 380 at 4-5. 
73. Most federal government agencies and operations depend upon annual 
appropriations. Normally, agencies are not permitted to “augment” amounts provided by 
Congress. To the extent that they generate income or receive funds from the public, the 
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permit agencies or governmental organizational units to operate like an 
ongoing business. Like a business, however, the survival of revolving fund 
instrumentalities depends upon the generation of fees.74 Thus, all too often the 
pursuit of fees, rather than any congressionally mandated mission, drives these 
purchasing organizations.75 
 
Miscellaneous Receipts Statute requires those funds—typically termed miscellaneous 
receipts—to be returned to the general treasury. See 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) (2005) (requiring 
that absent a statutory or regulatory exception, “an official or agent of the Government 
receiving money for the Government from any source shall deposit the money in the 
Treasury as soon as practicable without any deduction for any charge or claim”). In other 
words, the agency cannot use them to fund other activities. By contrast, the revolving fund 
concept permits certain agencies to create funds, credit receipts to the fund, and use the 
funds without further congressional appropriation. See, e.g., JOHN E. JENSEN, QUICK 
REFERENCE TO FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 172 (2002). Interestingly, under the Economy 
Act, one of the most frequently used interagency vehicles, the ordering agency must pay the 
performing agency the actual costs of the goods or services provided. See 31 U.S.C. § 
1535(b); Use of Agencies’ Appropriations to Purchase Computer Hardware for Dep’t of 
Labor’s Executive Computer Network, B-238024, 70 Comp. Gen. 592 (1991). There is no 
such statutory restriction for GWACs; however, OMB guidance requires agencies to charge 
actual costs and to “transfer GWAC earnings to the miscellaneous receipts account of the 
U.S. Treasury’s General Fund.” GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, GAO-02-734, CONTRACT 
MANAGEMENT: INTERAGENCY CONTRACT PROGRAM FEES NEED MORE OVERSIGHT 3 (2002). 
74. By analogy, most everywhere I shop these days, sales staff attempt to increase the 
vendor’s income by offering me a credit card in the hope that I’ll carry a balance and, over 
time, pay favorable interest rates. These retail establishments are not lending institutions per 
se, nor is lending their primary purpose. As a business, it makes sense for them to maximize 
their profit by entering a complementary line of business (in this case, lending). 
75. For a useful anecdote, see Steven L. Schooner, The Future of “Businesslike” 
Government: The CBD Asserts Its Rights Against Debtor Federal Agencies, 41 GOV’T 
CONTRACTOR ¶ 112 (1999); Andrew M. Sherman, GPO Answers Critics: Commerce 
Department Policy to Suspend Publication of Solicitation Notices for Debtor Agencies 
Furthers Procurement Process Objectives, 41 GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 167 (1999). The 
Government Printing Office (GPO) threatened to bar certain federal purchasing offices from 
publishing solicitation notices in the Commerce Business Daily (CBD) because those 
agencies had failed to pay their printing fees. (Since that time, the CBD has been replaced by 
FedBizOpps.) In so doing, the GPO ignored the mandate that the CBD “is the public 
notification media by which U.S. Government agencies identify proposed contract actions 
and contract awards.” FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 5.101 (2005). Both the Small Business Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 637(e) (2005), and the OFPP Act, 41 U.S.C. § 416, required agencies to publish 
notices in the CBD, and an outstanding debt to GPO was never an exception to the 
publication requirement; nor did such a debt excuse failure to comply with the publication 
and response times mandated in 48 C.F.R. § 5.203. 
[T]his comedy of errors raises fundamental questions regarding GPO and Commerce 
Department roles in managing the CBD. Publication of the CBD is not a business enterprise; 
it is a statutorily-mandated vehicle for dissemination of certain procurement information. 
There are numerous examples of more appropriate ventures for entrepreneurial Government 
such as the Postal Service, the Patent and Trademark Office, Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, or the Defense Commissary Agency, which engage in fee-for-service 
transactions. The public interest does not require that citizens refusing to buy stamps be 
permitted to send letters. The public interest would require, however, that GSA not 
disconnect the Internal Revenue Service’s telephone service in early April if the IRS failed to 
liquidate its phone bills promptly . . . . 
Intricacies of fiscal law, particularly the shell game of interagency budgetary transfers, need 
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In practice, this creates an unfortunate “race to the bottom.” Fee-based 
purchasing instrumentalities have no stake in the outcome of contracts that they 
award. The PM at the purchasing (or receiving) agency willingly pays a 
franchise fee to the servicing agency to avoid the bureaucratic constraints (such 
as competition mandates) that slow down the PM’s in-house contracting 
officer. In turn, the servicing agency gladly streamlines the purchase. 
Moreover, once the contract is awarded, the servicing agency has no interest in 
administering, nor does it have sufficient resources to manage, the contract. 
Thus, in exchange for a fee, the PM can choose a favored contractor without 
competition and enjoy the contractor’s performance unfettered by typical 
contract administration.76 The Interior Department Inspector General 
explained: “Without the checks and balances provided by effective internal 
controls, the ‘risk taking,’ ‘out-of-box’ thinking, and ‘one-stop shopping’ 
advertised by NBC and encouraged by fee-for-service organizations can result 
in inappropriate procurements.”77 
The Abu Ghraib experience offers a startling illustration of this 
relationship. Because its existence depends upon generating fees, the Interior 
Department’s NBC willingly provided the Army with contractor personnel. 
Despite receipt of that fee, the NBC apparently did not feel compelled to 
scrutinize whether the contracting vehicle was being used for its intended 
purpose, whether the scope of the Army’s requirement was too broad, nor how 
the contractor personnel would be managed. In short, for a nominal fee, the 
NBC permitted the Army to inappropriately use a streamlined, commercial 
contracting vehicle to obtain contractor personnel through a closed, 
noncompetitive process, after which neither the Army nor Interior procurement 
personnel managed the contractors’ performance. 
On July 13, 2004, the GSA unveiled its “Get It Right” plan to ensure 
proper use of its schedule contracts. This initiative is as well intentioned as it is 
overdue. The plan will assess regulatory compliance and “calls for GSA to 
proactively supervise the proper use of its contract vehicles. . . .”78 More must 
be done. Without aggressive congressional intervention, it is unlikely that 
 
not concern taxpayers. The public—whether contractors hoping to compete for work or those 
that rely upon Government missions facilitated by procurements—cannot be held responsible 
for interagency cash management issues. Nor should one agency’s revolving fund status 
adversely impact another agency’s ability to carry out its mission. 
Schooner, supra, at 5. 
76. Of the 12 procurements reviewed by the Interior Department IG, 11 were outside 
the scope of the work of the GSA schedules used. For a similar scenario, see, e.g., Floro & 
Assoc., B-285481.3, B-285481.4, Oct. 25, 2000, 2000 CPD ¶ 172 where the GAO 
“conclude[s] that the work delineated under the task order is materially different from the 
work contemplated under . . . [the multiple award ID/IQ] contract and therefore exceeds that 
contract’s scope.” 
77. Interior IG Report, supra note 15, at 3. 
78. Press Release, Gen. Serv. Admin., GSA “Get It Right” Plan Will Ensure Proper 
Use of GSA Contract Vehicles (July 13, 2004), http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/content 
View.do?P=XI&contentId=16390&contentType=GSA_BASIC (last visited Mar. 26, 2005). 
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confidence and credibility can be restored to the existing interagency services 
procurement regime. More recently, the Government Accountability Office 
took a huge step in the right direction by adding the “management of 
interagency contracting” to its High Risk List.79 The GAO accurately noted 
both the benefits—improved speed and efficiency—and risks associated with 
the current interagency contracting regime: 
If not properly managed, a number of factors can make these interagency 
contract vehicles high risk . . .: (1) they are attracting rapid growth of taxpayer 
dollars; (2) they are being administered and used by some agencies that have 
limited expertise with this contracting method; and (3) they contribute to a 
much more complex environment in which accountability has not always been 
clearly established. Use of these contracts, therefore, demands a higher degree 
of business acumen and flexibility on the part of the federal acquisition 
workforce than in the past. . . . [T]he challenges associated with these 
contracts, recent problems related to their management, and the need to ensure 
that the government effectively implements measures to bolster oversight and 
control so that it is well positioned to realize the value of these contracts 
warrants designation of interagency contracting as a new high-risk area.80 
The Fay Report suggests another unanticipated pathology that derives from 
the use of an interagency purchasing scheme. Keeping in mind that the Army 
used Interior Department and GSA contracting vehicles to obtain contractor 
support, the Fay Report expresses concern that because “[s]ome of the 
employees at Abu Ghraib were not DoD contractor employees,” they may not 
be subject to the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act,81 which might 
permit them to avoid criminal prosecution.82 
CONCLUSION: RESPONSIBLE DELEGATION OR ABDICATION OF 
RESPONSIBILITY? 
The Abu Ghraib experience, while atypical in terms of its brutality and the 
public outcry it spawned, is sadly typical of a much broader problem that 
pervades public procurement.83 A unique combination of policies spanning 
 
79. GOV’T ACCT. OFFICE, GAO-05-207, HIGH RISK SERIES: AN UPDATE 24-28 (2005), 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05207.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2005). 
80. Id. at 25. 
81. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267 (2005). 
82. FAY REPORT, supra note 14, at 50. The Fay Report underscored the word “may,” 
suggesting that Fay’s legal advisors conceded that this represents an issue of first 
impression. 
83. Problems with Economy Act transactions involving the DoD are not new: 
DoD activities issued Economy Act orders that increased costs by an estimated $16.9 
million, violated the Competition in Contracting Act, delegated inherently Governmental 
functions to contractors, procured $40.1 million in . . . resources without a proper delegation 
of procurement authority, caused apparent violations of the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts 
Act of 1936, obtained unauthorized personal services, inappropriately issued $9.6 million in 
project orders, and required . . . employees . . . without security clearances to have access to 
classified information . . . . 
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more than a decade—the outsourcing initiative, the acquisition workforce 
reductions,84 the new public management85 (manifested in the form of 
acquisition reform), and the government’s massive post-September 11th surge 
in activity—has conspired to place unsustainable pressure upon the 
government’s public procurement system. 
It is not surprising that a downsized government workforce, facing 
increasing demands, can lose sight of the foundations of successful public 
procurement regimes—such as reliance upon competition and a commitment to 
transparency and integrity86—and embrace whatever means are necessary to 
meet its customers’ needs. Thus, the streamlined, highly flexible task or 
delivery order contract has become the government manager’s weapon of 
choice for surviving the outsourcing crisis. Program managers, faced with 
severe personnel shortages, favor these fast and all-too-often invisible contracts 
because they permit seemingly unfettered flexibility in use of contractor 
employees. In turn, sponsoring agencies, increasingly dependent upon the fees 
that these cross-servicing agreements generate, gladly serve as a body shop, 
providing personnel to augment skeletal organizations. This co-dependency 
accelerates a predictable race to the bottom. However well intentioned the 
creation of these streamlined purchasing vehicles, the reliance on interagency 
task order service contracts, in practice, has grown to resemble a self-
replicating virus, without checks or controls. 
 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT NO. 94-008, DOD PROCUREMENTS 
THROUGH THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY TECHNOLOGY BROKERING PROGRAM 1 (1993). 
84. The acquisition workforce suffered another setback in the Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2005. Section 841 of the Senate version of the bill, as originally passed, 
would have limited further reductions in the defense acquisition workforce. See H.R. 4200, 
108th Cong. (2004). That protection, however, disappeared in the conference report. See 
Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 4200, http://www.house.gov/rules/108_conf_dod 
4200.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2005). 
85. The new public management (NPM) or reinvention of government gained 
popularity as an alternative to the perceived inefficiencies of government bureaucracies. 
CHRISTOPHER POLLITT, THE ESSENTIAL PUBLIC MANAGER 32-33 (2003). The push to 
streamline government began in New Zealand, Australia, and the United Kingdom and took 
hold in the United States in the 1990s through former Vice-President Al Gore’s National 
Performance Review (NPR), which pledged to create a government that “works better and 
costs less.” See Donald F. Kettl, The Global Revolution in Public Management: Driving 
Themes, Missing Links, 16 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 446, 446 (1997); see also DAVID 
OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT 
IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO STATE HOUSE, CITY HALL TO 
PENTAGON (1992). With a focus on outcome over process, NPM seeks to cut red tape, 
downsize the public sector, increase privatization, encourage contracting out, deregulate 
government agencies, and empower (indeed even expect) public employees to steer, not row. 
See James Q. Wilson, Can the Bureaucracy Be Deregulated?, in DEREGULATING THE PUBLIC 
SERVICE: CAN GOVERNMENT BE IMPROVED? 37, 41 (John J. DiIulio ed., 1994) (citing NAT’L 
PERFORMANCE REV., U.S. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FROM RED TAPE TO 
RESULTS: CREATING GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETTER AND COSTS LESS (1993)). 
86. See, e.g., Steven L. Schooner, Desiderata: Objectives for a System of Government 
Contract Law, 11 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 103 (2002). 
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In processing the relentless deluge of contract requirements that must be 
fulfilled, individual contracting officers lack the time to contemplate that, 
through these contracts, the government is delegating the responsibility of 
governance to contractors. Sadly, the result is that this wholesale delegation of 
governmental authority is marked by haste, rather than caution. As episodic 
transgressions become routine, it is not enough for the government to retort 
that, typically, the government receives good value for its money. Rather, 
Congress, the media, the contractor community, and the public require 
sufficient insight into the process to determine whether the government’s 
contracting practices are appropriately competitive, effective, efficient, and 
fair. Without systemic credibility, even a best-value result cannot sustain a 
public procurement regime.87 
To stem the tide, Congress must renew the government’s commitment to 
the long-standing foundations of successful public procurement regimes. 
Congress must insist that the government’s contracting actions take place in the 
open, subject to competition, oversight, and review. The government must 
invest scarce resources to recruit, train, motivate, and retain talented purchasing 
professionals. Similarly, it must either create new, or restore and invigorate its 
existing (but badly depleted), oversight organizations, such as the Defense 
Contract Management Agency and the Defense Contract Audit Agency. 
Congress also must make clear that if sponsoring agencies earn fees for 
facilitating other agencies’ contracts, those sponsoring agencies will be held 
strictly accountable for the contractual outcomes. In other words, contracting 
organizations must obey the law, manage the contracts they award, and ensure 
that the government receives value for its money. The alternative is chaos. As 
the Abu Ghraib experience demonstrates, when public trust is at stake, that 
result is unacceptable. 
 
87. Here, I part company with those, like Steve Kelman, who prefer the 
consequentialist view that public managers should be granted more freedom to determine the 
means while being held responsible only for meeting certain agreed-upon ends. See Steven 
Kelman, Deregulating Federal Procurement: Nothing to Fear but Discretion Itself?, in 
DEREGULATING THE PUBLIC SERVICE, supra note 85, at 116. “If you want better 
management,” argues David Osborne, “untie the managers’ hands and let them manage. 
Hold them accountable for results—not for following silly rules.” David Osborne, 
Bureaucracy Unbound, WASH. POST MAG., Oct. 13, 1996, at 8. Some also refer to this 
theory as “accountability for performance.” See ROBERT D. BEHN, RETHINKING DEMOCRATIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY 9-10 (2001). 
